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fiOUHT. OF APPEALS 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this appeal are those listed in the caption, 
the Department of the Air Force, the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, and Gregory DeBloois. 
In the event this petition results in a reported case the 
Petitioner requests the court style this matter the Department of 
the Air Force v. DeBloois rather that the Department of the Air 
Force v. Board of Review in order to avoid confusion between this 
matter and the two other reported cases already styled Department 
of the Air Force v. Board of Review. 
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STATEMENT OF .JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the 
petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16, and Utah Code Ann. 
35-4-10. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION: 
The issues for which Petitioner seeks review are the 
following: 
1. Did the Board of Review commit legal error in 
determining that the Petitioner and the Department of Employment 
Security shared fault when the Administrative Law Judge failed to 
find for the Air Force at the conclusion of the first evidentiary 
hearing? The standard of review for reviewing conclusions of law 
is to review without deference under a correction of error 
standard. Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Bd. of Equalization, 853 
P.2d 894 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved in the appeal to 
the Board of Review, record at 211. 
2. Are the findings off fact supporting the legal 
conclusion of shared fault supported by substantial evidence 
within the record? The standard of review for reviewing findings 
of fact is to affirm only if the findings are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court. Utah Cede Ann. 63-46b-16(4)(g). This issue 
was preserved in the appeal to the Board of Review, record at 
211. 
3. Did the finding of shared fault constitute an abuse of 
discretion by the Board of Review? The standard of review for 
this issue is "is the decision reasonable and rational?", 
Wagstaff v. Department of Employment Sec, 826 P.2d 1069 (Utah 
App. 1992). This issue was preserved in the appeal to the Board 
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of Review, record at 211. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW: 
Statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal are included in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for review of a final order of the Board 
of Review of the Industrial Commission holding the Petitioner 
(Air Force) and the Department of Employment Security (Employment 
Security) shared fault in the entry of an order by an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) allowing Gregory J. DeBloois 
(DeBloois) unemployment benefits which decision the ALJ later 
reversed. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
DeBloois was fired by the Air Force. He applied for 
unemployment benefits. They were denied. He appealed and was 
given an evidentiary hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ allowed 
benefits. The Air Force appealed to the Board of Review which 
sustained the ALJ. The Air Force petitioned this court for 
review. Before the time for briefing on that Petition for Review 
Employment Security contacted the Air Force and a stipulation was 
reached referring the matter back to the ALJ for an additional 
hearing during which the ALJ was specifically instructed, by 
Employment Security, to apply applicable law pertaining to expert 
testimony. 
The second evidentiary hearing was held and DeBloois was 
denied benefits. The ALJ did not specifically address the issue 
of time for repayment to the Air Force in his order entered after 
the second hearing. The Air Force then asked that it be 
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immediately reimbursed for money it had paid to compensate 
Employment Security for benefits paid DeBloois. 
C. DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Board of Review reviewed the second order of the ALJ and 
held, in its order of December 20, 1994, that Employment Security 
and Air Force "shared" fault for the prior improper payment 
following the first hearing. Review of the December 20, 1994 
order is sought here. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Gregory DeBloois was employed as an electronics mechanic at 
Hill Air Force Base, record at 1. As a result of drug related 
offenses, Mr. DeBloois and the Air Force entered into a "last 
chance agreement" to the effect that he would have no more 
misconduct, record at 7. As part of that agreement, he agreed to 
random drug testing on short notice when requested by the Air 
Force, record at 7. Subsequently, Mr. DeBloois was asked to 
report for urinalysis, record at 4. The specimen he then 
submitted was tested and determined to be water, not urine, 
record at 5. Pursuant to the last chance agreement, Mr. 
DeBloois' employment with the Air Force was terminated for 
failing to submit a urine specimen for testing, record at 4. 
Mr. DeBloois applied for unemployment benefits which were 
denied by Employment Security, record at 11. Mr. DeBloois 
appealed the initial decision and after an evidentiary hearing 
the Employment Security ALJ found the Air Force had not met its 
burden of proof to show DeBloois was terminated for just cause 
under the code and regulations, record at 75. 
At the beginning of the hearing the parties stipulated the 
issue to be determined was whether "... the Claimant either 
failed a drug test or tampered with that drug test", record at 25. 
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Air Force called three witnesses. DeBloois's supervisor, 
Mr. Gailey, who testified he fired DeBloois for violating the 
stipulated settlement agreement, record at 42. Elise Kidd, who 
testified she was an Employee Relations Assistant for the Air 
Force who assists in administration of the drug testing program, 
record at 52. She described the general procedures used in drug 
testing and DeBloois's right to question the results with medical 
and other personnel, record at 52. 
Air Force also called Dr. David J. Kuntz who testified he 
was the director of technical operations for Northwest 
Toxicology, the firm with whom Air Force had contracted to 
perform drug testing. He has a BA in Pharmacy, an MA and PhD 
degrees in Pharmaceutical Sciences, record at 30. He testified 
he has been employed full time in forensic urine testing since 
1988 and is in charge of the day to day testing and 
interpretation for Northwest Toxicology, record at 30. 
Dr. Kuntz further testified that based on his expertise in 
the field and the sample provided by DeBloois DeBloois had 
tampered urine specimen and submitted water rather than urine, 
record at 33. Numerous factors led him to the conclusion the 
sample was water. First, the physical appearance of the specimen 
led to that conclusion. It was clear and did not foam when 
shaken as urine does. The physical appearance of the specimen 
triggered additional testing of the sample for adulteration, 
record at 31 & 33. Urine has a specific gravity of 1.03 to 
1.003. It would only be 1.00 if it was especially dilute, record 
at 32. He also testified the documents associated with the 
specimen indicated there were no problems with the chain of 
custody, record at 31. 
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The ALJ found DeBloois's urine sample was especially dilute 
because he had consumed six or seven glasses of water the morning 
of the test, record at 71. This finding was not supported by 
evidence in the record. DeBloois actual testimony was that he 
,!
 . . . drank water until he had to go" record at 58, that he 
normally "... drink [s] a horrendous amount of water trying to, 
you know be healthy and lose weight and what not" record at 41, 
"You're supposed to drink a minimum of what? eight to ten glasses 
of water a day?" record at 61. DeBloois himself did not suggest 
his water consumption resulted in the sample containing water 
rather than urine. When asked by the ALJ to what he attributed 
"... the test results to be as provided to us by Dr. Kunz (sic)" 
he replied "I have no idea, sir", record at 59. Contrary to the 
ALJ's finding nothing in the record of that hearing supports the 
position that DeBloois drank seven glasses of water waiting to 
provide a specimen or even that he drank more water that day than 
he normally does. 
Nothing anywhere in the record of the first hearing suggests 
that even if DeBloois drank seven glasses of water that volume 
would be sufficient to cause the urine to be "especially dilute." 
Dr. Kuntz testified that even if the specimen was diluted urine 
it would still foam but just foam less, record at 33. The 
DeBloois specimen did not foam at all, record at 31-33. 
Another test was performed for the presence of creatinine, a 
substance present in urine. There was no creatinine in 
DeBloois's sample, record at 37. DeBloois's sample had a ph of 
6.3 which is the ph of water but not of urine, record at 37. 
Dr. Kuntz testified that the only aspect of the testing done 
at the collection site is for temperature, record at 35. He also 
testified people have used chemical and mechanical warmers to 
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warm specimens in the past, record at 36. The person giving the 
sample can manipulate the temperature of the sample by reading it 
from the container which has a temperature device on the side, 
record at 36. The specimen container did not appear to be 
tampered with after having left the collection site, record at 
37. In other words the container and the label identifying it as 
belonging to DeBloois were intact and in good condition when they 
arrived at Northwest Toxicology. 
The ALJ's decision following the first hearing is found at 
page 70 of the record. The findings of fact consume one and one 
half pages of that decision, record at 71-72. Virtually all of 
the findings deal with the mechanics of DeBloois providing his 
specimen and his denial that he provided water. Despite 11 pages 
of testimony by Dr. Kuntz on the chemical and physical evidence 
showing the sample was not urine the ALJ concluded "The 
Administrative Law Judge was unable to conclude, through 
competent evidence, that the claimant did not submit a legitimate 
urine specimen ..." record at 75. He further concluded "There 
was no other medical evidence presented at the hearing to confirm 
that the liquid in the sample bottle provided by the claimant was 
not his own urine" record at 75. Nowhere in his decision did the 
ALJ give any reason for wholly rejecting the expert testimony of 
Dr. Kuntz. He did not find any lack of foundation, insufficient 
education or experience, or otherwise discredit Dr. Kuntz as an 
expert, he simply ignored him and his testimony. 
In the transcript of the first hearing the ALJ does give 
insight into his thought processes. 
"Well, I guess in this particular hearing, what I had 
not had provided in the way of evidence is any type of 
other information from the testing laboratory as to 
what other testing procedures were -- was used. I have 
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no -- I have no test form from the employer. I do not 
know that -- excuse me, from Northwest Toxicology, I do 
not know for a certainty, I do not have documentation 
that the, uh, Northwest Toxicology tested for, uh, drug 
-- drugs or whether or not they, uh, tested for any 
other substance in that urine. We -- we do not have 
that report, and I'm assuming, Mr., uh, Price, you 
don't have that as part of your documentation, record 
at 67. 
Though the decision does not contain any findings faulting 
the chain of custody from the record the ALJ appears to be 
concerned about a chain of custody issue, also at page 67 of the 
record. However, the exhibits offered at the hearing establish 
the chain of custody and show the sample was taken and mailed on 
February 8th and analyzed on February 10th, record at 5, 6, and 
Dr Kuntz testified the chain of custody documents were in order, 
record at 31. 
From the findings and the decision it is clear the ALJ 
declined to accept the expert testimony of Dr. Kuntz because, as 
he stated, "The Administrative Law Judge was unable to conclude, 
through competent evidence, that the claimant did not submit a 
legitimate urine specimen on February 8, 1993" record at 75. In 
other words, the ALJ did not understand that the opinion of an 
expert is competent evidence. 
The Air Force appealed the ALJ's decision to the Board of 
Review which sustained the ALJ in a 2-1 decision, record at 90. 
The Air Force sought review in this court of the decision of the 
Board of Review based on the ALJ's complete disregard of expert 
testimony which established the sample given by Mr. DeBloois was 
not urine, record at 98. 
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After the Air Force filed the Petition for Review, the Air 
Force and the Employment Security agreed to have the matter 
remanded for rehearing by the ALJ, record at 105. In preparation 
for the rehearing, the Board of Review provided specific 
instructions to the ALJ on certain evidentiary matters at issue 
in the case, record at 112. In that decision Employment Security 
specifically instructed the ALJ, by underlining portions of the 
remand decision, "The above documentation will be admissible as 
competent under various exceptions to the hearsay rule, including 
Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence respecting 'records of 
regularly conducted activity,' unless determined otherwise by a 
court of law." [emphasis in the original] record at 113. In 
other words, Employment Security saw the error of the ALJ's 
reasoning in his first hearing and instructed him on the same law 
Air Force had complained about in its appeal to the Board of 
Review from the first hearing, record at 101. 
The ALJ reopened the hearing and, after considering all the 
evidence, found, in a decision dated March 25, 1994, DeBloois had 
been discharged for just cause under the code and applicable 
regulations, record at 174. At the second hearing, held March 
23, 1994, the ALJ did not receive any types of information 
different than he had in the first hearing. Dr. Kuntz did appear 
personally and described the same tests which had been run on the 
specimen in more detail but all of the types of evidence 
submitted were the same. The ALJ specifically declined to accept 
documents pertaining to the chain of custody of the specimen, 
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record at 156, but ruled for Air Force nonetheless. 
In the second hearing DeBloois acknowledged that his 
specimen had been tested by a second laboratory at the request of 
his union and that test had also found the specimen was water 
record at 140, 
At the time of the March 25, 1994 Decision, the initial 
action was still pending before the Utah Court of Appeals, having 
never been dismissed by that court. 
In the time of the March 25, 1994 Decision, the ALJ found 
there had been an overpayment to Mr. DeBloois in the amount of 
$6,240.00. This overpayment represented compensation paid to Mr. 
DeBloois as a result of the prior decision of the ALJ, which was 
subsequently reversed. The ALJ found this overpayment to be the 
fault of Mr. DeBloois, record at 183. 
The Air Force pays unemployment compensation pursuant to 
R562-85 of the Utah Administrative Regulations. That chapter of 
the Industrial Commission's regulations deals with contributions 
and reimbursement of unemployment benefits by governmental units. 
R562-85-5 addresses "Reimbursable Employer's Liability for 
Benefits Paid". Significant in the language of that section is 
that which reads "The employer will not be liable for benefits 
overpaid as a result of a Department decision which is later 
reversed. Any benefits established as an overpayment due to 
claimant fault will be deducted from the employer's liability or 
refunded as the overpayment is repaid by the claimant." 
In the ALJ's March 25, 1994 decision and the subsequent 
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decision of the Board of Review Employment Security has 
determined the Air Force is not liable for Mr. DeBloois' 
unemployment compensation, as it should have in the first 
instance. Rule 562-6d-4(2)(a)(1) deals with discretion for 
repayment. It allows collection to be postponed until additional 
benefits become due, if they become due, "if the Department or 
the employer share fault in the creation of the overpayment." 
The ALJ found that the Air Force shared fault because it failed 
to elicit evidence upon which he could sustain the prior denial 
of benefits, record at 183. Employment Security sustained that 
decision in its December 20, 1994 decision, record at 223. 
During the first hearing DeBloois was sworn and agreed to 
tell the truth, record at 57. While under oath he testified he 
provided a urine specimen, record at 59. The evidence adduced at 
that hearing showed the specimen he provided was water. He 
subsequently had the specimen tested again through his union. 
That test showed the specimen he provided was water, record at 
140. The ALJ, and the Board of Review ultimately concurred with 
the position of Air Force and Dr. Kuntz that the specimen was 
water, record at 183, 223. The only logical conclusion which can 
come from this chain of events is that DeBloois was lying when he 
testified he provided a urine specimen. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Air Force does not share fault for the overpayment. The Air 
Force provided expert testimony which established the specimen 
was dilute. The ALJ chose to ignore that testimony and relied on 
10 
his own speculation in entering findings of fact and reaching 
conclusions of law. Had the ALJ applied the law he would have 
ruled for the Air Force in the first instance. 
DeBloois's evidence was fraudulent. DeBloois provided no 
evidence which would support his position. His defense was only 
that he didn't know how it could have happened. He subsequently 
had his specimen tested a second time. That test also showed the 
sample he submitted was water. Because he lied his claim was 
fraudulent. 
Employment Security has a statutory duty to determine the 
facts. The ALJ failed to adequately inquire into areas upon 
which he ultimately based his decision. The result was fault of 
Employment Security but not the Air Force. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SHARE FAULT 
In his analysis of the evidence it appears the ALJ was 
trying to force the round peg of this case into the square hole 
of Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 
1989). There the employee was allowed benefits after being 
terminated for marijuana use because the only evidence the 
employer offered concerning the testing was hearsay from an 
office manager who had no personal knowledge of the procedure. 
Grace Drilling does not apply in this case because Air Force 
submitted appropriate evidence through Dr. Kuntz, and the quality 
of the test was never an issue. 
Evidentiary procedures used in administrative hearings in 
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Utah are less strict than those used in Utah courts, Utah Code 
Ann. 63-46b-8. The differences identified in Utah Code Ann. 63-
46b-8 serve only to relax the standards of the rules of evidence. 
That being the case it follows that evidence which must be 
considered in a court of law must also be considered in an 
administrative hearing. 
The ALJ ruled as he did because he didn't have any document 
showing the testing laboratory results. He made this ruling in 
the face of extensive testimony by Dr. Kuntz, who had been 
qualified as an expert without objection, as to the types of 
tests which had been performed and what they showed. As an 
expert Dr. Kuntz testified numerous tests showed DeBloois had 
substituted water for urine and that the specimen was in fact 
water. 
While it is unlikely the ALJ hears much expert testimony 
while presiding over unemployment hearings that fact does not 
allow him to completely ignore such testimony when it is offered. 
Documents are not the only variety of evidence which must be 
considered when offered. Rule 401, Utah R. Evd. instructs 
"Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would have 
been without the evidence." Where expert testimony will assist 
the ALJ in determining a fact he must consider it, Rule 702 Utah 
R. Evd. An expert witness specifically need not rely on 
admissible evidence in order to form and express an expert 
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opinion, Rule 703, Utah R. Evd. Neither the ALJ nor DeBloois 
cross examined Dr. Kuntz on the validity of the facts underlying 
the opinions given in his testimony as an expert witness. 
The record clearly shows the ALJ refused to consider the 
expert testimony of Dr. Kuntz because he did not understand the 
issues. Had the ALJ understood the rules of evidence and the 
place of expert testimony he could have reached no conclusion 
other than the specimen was water. When he reconvened the 
hearing at the direction of Employment Security the testimony he 
received was of exactly the same varieties he received in the 
first hearing. Air Force put on Dr. Kuntz who said the tests 
show it was water and DeBloois said it was not. Having been 
instructed by Employment Security as to the place of expert 
testimony the ALJ then made the ruling he should have made in the 
first instance. 
There is absolutely no basis in the record for the ALJ's 
self serving conclusion "The Administrative Law Judge allowed 
benefits on the basis of inadequate evidence submitted by the 
employer ..." record at 183. In reality, the ALJ allowed 
benefits based upon his own ignorance of the rules of evidence 
and the admissibility of the evidence which had been presented to 
him. The Air Force presented the same evidence at both hearings 
and bears no fault, shared or otherwise. 
B. FRAUD OVERPAYMENTS MUST BE REPAID TO THE AIR FORCE 
R562-5e, Utah Admin. Rules, pertains to fraud. It provides 
11
 [t] here must be a willful misrepresentation or concealment of 
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information for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits to 
which the claimant was not entitled for fraud to exist." R562-5e-
1. R562-5e-2 defines the elements of fraud under the regulation 
to be materiality, knowledge, and wilfulness. The ALJ could only 
get to the conclusion he ultimately reached if DeBloois had 
defrauded both Employment Security and the Air Force by filing a 
false claim and by lying at both hearings. Indeed, the ALJ 
found, and the Board of Review sustained the finding that "The 
only logical conclusion to be reached in this matter is that the 
claimant tampered with the testing procedures by substituting a 
substance for his urine" record at 181. 
R562-5e-5 provides "Repayment of overpayments established 
under this section of the Act will be collected in accordance 
with provisions of the Rules of Section 35-4-6(d) [now Utah Code 
Ann. 35-4-406(4) (a)] or by civil action ..." The term "will" in 
the regulation does not provide discretion to Employment Security 
in collecting payments obtined by fraud. Further, in his 
decision the ALJ cites R562-6d-4(2)(b), "The Department cannot 
exercise repayment discretion for fraud overpayments and these 
amounts are subject to all collection procedures" record at 183. 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. 35-4-406(4) (a) requires "Any 
person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as 
benefits under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall 
repay the sum to the commission for the fund." This section of 
the Act differs from others in which recoupment is discretionary. 
Since DeBloois obtained the payments through his active 
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fraud in the first instance they are subject to mandatory 
collection. Employment Security does not have the discretion to 
require the Air Force to wait for DeBloois to apply for benefits 
at some time in the future. 
C. THE ALJ WAS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN FACTS SUPPORTING HIS DECISION 
The dissent in the decision of the Board of Review correctly 
notes the ALJ was required, by the Administrative Procedures Act, 
to "... regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full 
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties 
reasonable opportunity to present their position." Utah Code Ann. 
63-46b-8(l)(a). The dissent also cited Nelson v. Department of 
Employment Security, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990) which shows 
the higher level of inquiry required of an ALJ where the parties 
were, as here, not represented by counsel. 
The ALJ's failure to follow up on issues he considered 
evidentiarily deficient, though they were ultimately shown not to 
be deficient, shows "fault" on the part of Employment Security 
but not of the Air Force. 
CONCLUSION 
DeBloois retained his employment with the Air Force only by 
agreeing to remain free of misconduct of any kind, including 
providing urine samples upon the Air Force's request. He did 
not. He then applied for benefits knowing he had substituted 
water for urine in the specimen he provided. During two 
evidentiary hearings he lied while under oath. He was clearly at 
fault. 
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When the ALJ conducted DeBloois's appeal hearing he failed 
to grasp the legal implications of the testimony of Dr. Kuntz and 
accordingly ignored it. He also failed to make sufficient 
inquiry into facts on which he ultimately based his decision. 
He, and accordingly his employer Employment Security, was at 
fault. 
The Air Force provided substantial evidence which when 
viewed in light of the whole record leads .only to the conclusion 
that DeBloois's specimen was water, not urine. The ALJ was 
required to accept that evidence or explain why he did not. 
There was no such explanation. The sufficiency of the evidence 
was so clear to Employment Security that it stipulated to sending 
the matter back to the ALJ without attempting to defend the Air 
Force's initial Petition for Review. To now suggest that the 
evidence was inadequate and the Air Force is at fault is absurd. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioner asks this court to reverse the decision of the 
Board of Review denying immediate payment and order the 
Department of Employment Security to take whatever actions are 
legal and necessary to recoup the money improperly paid DeBloois. 
Dated this ///? d aY o f March, 1995. 
Robert<JI\ Wil 
Attorney for Petlitidner 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. 35-4-406(4)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-8 
Utah R. Evd. 401 
Utah R. Evd. 702 
Utah R. Evd. 703 
R562-5e, Utah Admin. Rules 
R562-6d-4(2) Utah Admin. Rules 
R562-85-5 Utah Admin. Rules 
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35-4-406 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Swiecicki v Department of Emp Sec , 667 P2d 
28 (Utah 1983) 
Leaving employment in order to follow a 
spouse to a rev> location is \oluntary" witnin 
tne meaning of the sta u*e Chandler\ Depart 
ment oi EmD Sec 678 ?2d 315 (Utah 1984) 
SuD»tantial e\iaence buoported the boards 
finding that employee ler\ work of his own 
vohuon where he quit ^ather than work nignts 
for a two-wee* perod Aaams \ Board of Re 
view 776 P2d 639 (Utah Ct ApD 1989) 
—Work force reduction. 
A decision to quit in the face of an impending 
work force reduction does not render the deci-
sion involuntary Robinson v Department of 
Emp Sec 827 P 2d 250 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
Cited in Department of Emp Sec \ Ninth 
Circuit Court ex rel Cedar CVv Dep t 718 P 2d 
782 (Utah 1986) Allen v Department of Emp 
Sec 781 P2d 888 (Utah Ct Aup 1989,, De 
partment of Air Force v Swider, 824 P2d 448 
'Utah Ct App 1991) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L Rev 95, 113 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi 
cial Decisions — Labor, 1988 Utah L Rev 236 
C.J.S. — 81 C J S Social Security and Public 
Welfare §§ 161, 211, 212, 214 to 216, 218-220, 
222-264 
AX R. — Employee's insubordination as bar-
ling unemployment compensation, 26 A L R 3d 
1333 
Work-connected inefficiency or negligence as 
"misconduct" barring unemployment compen-
sation, 26 A L R 3d 1356 
Unemployment compensation eligibility as 
affected by claimant's refusal to work at par-
ticular times or on particular shifts, 35 
A L R 3d 1129, 12 A L R 4th 611 
Termination of employment because of preg-
nancy as affecting nght to unemployment com-
pensation, 51 A L R 3d 254 
Right to unemployment compensation as af-
fected by receipt of pension, 56 A L R 3d 520 
Right to unemployment compensation as af-
fected by receipt of social security benefits, 56 
ALR3d552 
Eligibility of strikers to obtain public assis-
tance, 57 A L R 3d 1303 
Discharge for absenteeism or tardiness as 
affecting nght to unemployment compensation, 
58ALR3d674 
Alcoholism or intoxication as ground for dis-
charge justifying denial of unemployment com-
pensation, 64 A L R 4th 1151 
Unemployment compensation burden of 
proof as to voluntariness of separation, 73 
A L R 4th 1093 
Eligibility for unemployment compensation 
of employee who left employment based on 
belief that involuntary discharge was immi-
nent, 79 A L R 4th 528 
Unemployment compensation eligibility 
where claimant leaves employment under cir-
cumstances interpreted as a firing by the claim-
ant but as a voluntary quit by the employer, 80 
A L R 4th 7 
Unemployment compensation eligibility as 
affected by claimant's refusal to work at par-
ticular times or on particular shifts for domes-
tic or family reasons, 2 A L R 5th 475 
Unemployment compensation claimant's eli-
gibility as affected by loss of, or failure to 
obtain, license, certificate, or similar qualifica-
tion for continued employment, 15 A L R 5th 
653 
Key Numbers. — Social Security and Public 
Welfare <s=> 381 
35-4-406. Claims for benefits — Continuing jur isdic t ion — 
Appeal — Notice of decision — Repayment of 
benefits fraudulently received, 
(1) (a) Claims for benefits shall be made and shall be determined by the 
commission or its authorized representative or referred to an administra-
tive law judge in accordance with rules adopted by the commission 
(b) Each employer shall post and maintain m places readily accessible 
to individuals in his service pnnted statements concerning benefit rights, 
claims for benefits, and the other matters relating to the administration of 
this chapter as prescribed by rule of the commission. 
(c) Each employer shall supply to individuals in his service copies of the 
printed statements or other materials relating to claims for benefits when 
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and as the commission may by rule prescribe. The printed statements and 
other materials shall be supplied by the commission to each employer 
without cost to the employer. 
(2) (a) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous. 
(b) Upon its own initiative or upon application of any party affected, the 
commission or its authorized representatives may on the basis of change 
in conditions or because of a mistake as to facts, review a decision allowing 
or disallowing in whole or in part a claim for benefits. 
(c) The review shall be conducted in accordance with rules adopted by 
the commission and may result in a new decision t ha t may award, 
terminate, continue, increase, or decrease benefits, or may result in a 
referral of the claim to an appeal tribunal. 
(d) Notice of any redetermination shall be promptly given to the party 
applying for redetermination and to other parties entitled to notice of the 
original determination, in the manner prescribed in this section with 
respect to notice of an original determination. 
(e) The new order shall be subject to review and appeal as provided in 
this section. 
(f) A review may not be made after one year from the date of the 
original determination, except in cases of fraud or claimant fault as 
provided in Subsection (4). 
(3) (a) The claimant or any other party entitled to notice of a determination 
as provided may file an appeal from the determination with an adminis-
trative law judge within ten days after the date of mailing of the notice to 
his last-known address or, if the notice is not mailed, within ten days after 
the date of delivery of the notice. 
(b) Unless the appeal or referral is withdrawn with permission of the 
administrative law judge, after affording the parties reasonable opportu-
nity for a fair hearing, the administrative law judge shall make findings 
and conclusions and on tha t basis affirm, modify, or reverse the determi-
nation. 
(c) The administrative law judge shall first give notice of the pendency 
of an appeal to the commission, which may then be a party to the 
proceedings. 
(d) The parties shall be promptly notified of the administrative law 
judge's decision and shall be furnished with a copy of the decision and the 
findings and conclusions in support of the decision. 
(e) The decision is considered to be final unless, within 30 days after the 
date of mailing of notice to the party's last-known address, or in the 
absence of mailed notice, within ten days after the delivery of the notice, 
further appeal is initiated under Section 35-4-508. 
(4) (a) Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as 
benefits under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall repay the 
sum to the commission for the fund. 
(b) If any person, by reason of his own fault, has received any sum as 
benefits under this chapter to which under a redetermination or decision 
pursuant to this section he has been found not entitled, he shall repay the 
sum, or shall, in the discretion of the commission, have the sum deducted 
from any future benefits payable to him, or both. 
(c) In any case in which under this subsection a claimant is liable to 
repay to the commission any sum for the fund, the sum shall be collectible 
in the same manner as provided for contributions due under this chapter. 
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(5) (a) If any person has received any sum as benefits under this chapter to 
which under a redetermination or decision he was not entitled, and it has 
been found that he was without fault in the matter, he is not liable to repay 
the sum but shall be liable to have the sum deducted from any future 
benefits payable to him. 
(b) The commission may waive recovery of the overpayment if it is 
shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the claimant has the 
inability to meet more than the basic needs of survival for an indefinite 
period lasting at least several months. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 40, § 6; C. 1943, 
42-2a-6;L.1949,ch.53,§ 1; 1951, ch. 50, § 1; 
1955, ch. 60, § 1; 1976, ch. 19, § 3; 1989, ch. 
120, § 3;1990,ch.255,§ 1; 1993, ch. 241, § 2; 
C. 1953, 35-4-6; renumbered by L. 1994, ch. 
169, § 35. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted "ad-
ministrative law judge" for "appeal referee" 
throughout the section. 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
revised the subsection designations to substi-
ANALYSIS 
Appeal. 
Due process of law. 
Failure to timely file appeal. 
—Good cause. 
Nature of proceeding. 
Notice. 
Reduction of penalty unauthorized. 
Repayment of benefits. 
Review of eligibility determinations. 
Cited. 
Appeal. 
Claimant has right of appeal from determi-
nation of deputy of ineligibility to benefits, and 
appeal tribunal has right to modify, affirm or 
set aside deputy's decision. National Tunnel & 
Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 39, 
102 P.2d 508 (1940). 
Due process of law. 
The fact that claimant was not present at 
hearing by representative which resulted in 
denial of relief did not deprive him of due 
process of law where he was present at subse-
quent hearing and adduced evidence before 
appeal examiner, and both examiner and indus-
trial commission, in reviewing case, had right 
to consider findings of representative. Employ-
ees of Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 
Utah 88, 104 P.2d 197 (1940). 
Failure to timely file appeal. 
In the absence of a timely filing of appeal 
from determination denying plaintiff unem-
tute numbers for letters, correcting an internal 
reference accordingly; in Subsection (3), in-
serted "first" in the second sentence of the 
second paragraph and substituted "30 days" for 
"ten days" in the second sentence of the third 
paragraph; and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 1994 amendment, effective October 2, 
1994, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 35-4-6, and made related refer-
ence and other stylistic changes. 
ployment benefits, the appeals referee had no 
jurisdiction to hear plaintifFs case. Jones v. 
Department of Emp. Sec, 641 P.2d 156 (Utah 
1982). 
Where claimant was notified of denial of 
benefits after deadline for filing appeal, and 
subsequently filed appeal approximately three 
weeks after receiving notification, his appeal 
was barred not for his excusable failure to file 
before the deadline, but rather for his unex-
plained delay in acting after receiving notifica-
tion. Wood v. Department of Emp. Sec, 680 R2d 
38 (Utah 1984). 
A claimant who makes an untimely filing of 
an appeal may pursue the appeal if good cause 
is shown for the delay, but stress due to family 
problems does not constitute good cause for a 
delay. Kirkwood v. Department of Emp. Sec, 
709 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1985). 
Where plaintiff was unable to sufficiently 
explain why he filed an appeal more than four 
months after he was on notice of his appeal 
rights and there was ample evidence that plain-
tiff learned of his right to appeal significantly 
more than ten days before the appeal was filed, 
the Industrial Commission did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the appeal was 
not timely filed and not delayed for *ood cause. 
Arevalo v. Department of Emp. Sec, 745 P.2d 
847 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 R2d 
1278 (Utah 1988). 
Claimant's claim that she was confused by 
the term "calendar days" in the notice of her 
appeal rights, taking it to mean "working days," 
and that she reasonably needed extra time to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or 
power given to an agency by another statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-7, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Discovery, U.R.C.P. 
1987, ch. 161, § 263. 26 et seq. 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal 
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to 
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding offi-
cer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or 
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially 
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other 
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts 
within the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is 
hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudica-
tive proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be 
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that 
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential infor-
mation disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appro-
priate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-8, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Judicial notice, Utah 
1987, ch. 161, § 264; 1988, ch. 72, § 19. R. Evid. 201. 
Privileges, Utah R. Evid. 501 et 8eq. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cross-examination. nesses against him resulted in "substantial 
Agency decision revoking social worker's li- prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational & 
cense was reversed and his case was remanded Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah 
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford Ct. App. 1989). 
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene 
in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes 
to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall 
include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the proceeding; 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights 
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceed-
ing, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision 
of law; and * 
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency. 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he deter-
mines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in 
writing and sent by mail to the petitioner and each party. 
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the 
intervenor's participation in the adjudicative proceeding that are neces-
sary for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceed-
ing. 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after 
the intervention. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-9, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 265. 
ANALYSIS 
Requisites for intervention. 
Standing. 
Requisites for intervention. 
Although Subsection (2) does not grant an 
absolute right to intervene, it does establish a 
conditional right to intervene if the requisite 
legal interest is present. That right is subject 
only to the condition that the interests of jus-
tice and orderly conduct of the administrative 
proceedings will not be impaired. Millard 
County v. State Tax Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459 
(Utah 1991). 
Tax commission's denial of a county's motion 
to intervene in a proceeding to redetermine a 
taxpayer's sales tax liability was reversed, be-
cause the county met the requirements for in-
tervention and the commission's contention 
that allowing intervention would clog the en-
tire administrative system was highly exag-
gerated. Millard County v. State Tax Comm'n, 
823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1991). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Presumption not raised. 
Presumption upheld. 
Presumption not raised. 
Payment of portion of profits to defendant as 
partial reimbursement for expenditures of de-
fendant in connection with business premises 
did not raise presumption of a partnership, and 
plaintiff was required to meet his burden of 
proof without aid of presumption. Koesling v. 
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975). 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 75. 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§§ 159 to 165, 167. 
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 119. 
A.L.R. — Effect of presumption as evidence 
or upon burden of proof, where controverting 
evidence is introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19. 
Refusal of defendant in "public figure" libel 
case to identify claimed sources as raising pre-
sumption against existence of source, 19 
A.L.R.4th 919. 
Presumptions and evidence respecting iden-
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of 
this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform 
Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable 
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evi-
dence (1971), but the former rule defined rele-
vant evidence as that having a tendency to 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of remoteness. 
Cited. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984). 
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 
Presumption upheld. 
Where mother executed will and trust in-
strument, and it was later found that the will 
had been executed as a result of undue influ-
ence, there was a prima facie presumption of 
continued undue influence with respect to an 
alleged subsequent ratification of the trust. 
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 
1983). 
tification of land on which property taxes were 
paid to establish adverse possession, 36 
A.L.R.4th 843. 
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of 
multiple, nonmedical defendants — modern 
status, 59 A.L.R.4th 201. 
Medical malpractice: presumption or infer-
ence from failure of hospital or doctor to pro-
duce relevant medical records, 69 A.L.R.4th 
906. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=> 305, 
325; Evidence «=» 85 et seq. 
criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) 
or any subsequent revision of that section. 
prove or disprove the existence of any "mate-
rial fact." Avoiding the use of the term "mate-
rial fact" accords with the application given to 
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. 
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fisher ex rel. 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 765 
P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770 
P.2d 981 (Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777 
P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 
(Utah 1990); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and 
proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact 
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law. 
ARTICLE IV. 
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
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ARTICLE VII. 
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Rule 701, Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which 
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially merit, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules of Evidence rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
(1971). Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), contained similar language. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Relation to expert testimony. 
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a 
r gn n y. security guard, who compared a photograph of 
Relation to expert testimony.
 r , . , , ,, r , . . . 1 . 1 
r
 a footprint to the footprints that he saw at 
Pregnancy. burgularized premises. The fact that a ques-
The admission of a mother's testimony on tion might be capable of scientific determina-
the subject of gestation period of her pregnancy tion does not make lay opinion inadmissible if 
was not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 the provisions of this rule are met. State v. 
(Utah 1982). Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or oth- mony as to weather conditions, 56 A.L.R.3d 
erwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by 575. 
lay witness, 10 A.L.R.3d 258. Competency of nonexpert witness to testify, 
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based in criminal case, based upon personal observa-
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle tion, as to whether person was under the influ-
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.
 e n c e 0f drugs, 21 A.L.R.4th 905. 
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testi-
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(b)(4), 
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah U.R.C.P. 
Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in deter-
same. mining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4. 
Cross-References. — Blood tests to deter- Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting 
mine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-25-18
 nUmber of expert witnesses. Rule 16, U.R.C.P. 
et seq., 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Suicide. 
„ .
 r . . Cited 
Basis for opinion. 
Discretion of court. Basis for opinion. 
Foundation. Testimony of expert witness who relied on 
Qualification as expert. conversations with witnesses out of court was 
Reliability. admissible, since he may have meant he found 
Scientific evidence^ statements of witnesses reliable for purposes of 
—Hypnosis. his making judgment. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 
Subjects of opinion. P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
—Drug use. Facts or data used by a properly qualified 
—Identification. expert in forming an opinion need not be in 
—Securities fraud. evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied 
—Sexual abuse. on by experts in the witness's field of expertise. 
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Admissibility of expert testimom as to crim 
mal defendant s propensit\ toward sexual dew 
ation 42 A L R 4th 937 
Admissibility, a t criminal prosecution, of ex-
pert testimon> on reliability of e\ewitness tes 
timony, 46 A L R 4th 1047 
Admissibility of expert testimony a* to ap 
Dropnate punishment for con\ icted defendant 
47 A L R 4 t h 1069 
Right of independent expert to refuse to tes-
tify as to expert opinion 50 \ L R - th 680 
Necessity of expert testimony to snow stan 
dard of care in negligence action against msur 
ance agent or broker 52 A L R 4tn 1232 
Thermographic tests admissibility of test re-
sults in personal mjurv suits 56 A L R 4th 
1105 
Compelling testimonv of opponent» expert 
m state court, 66 A L R 4th 213 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
of electrophoresis of dried evidential^ blood-
stains, 66 A L R 4th 588 
Right of indigent defendant in criminal case 
to aid of s tate by appointment of investigator 
or expert, 71 A L R 4th 638, 72 A L R 4th 874, 
74 A L R 4th 388, 81 A L R 4th 259 
Admissibility of expert testimonv that item 
of clothing or footgear belonged to or w as worn 
by, particular individual, 71 A L R 4th 1148 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or 
enhanced testimony, 77 A L R 4th 927 
Admissibility of he detector test results, or of 
Advisory Committee Note — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and expands Rule 
56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) which 
limited facts or data not personally known to 
the expert to those made known to him at the 
hearing The provision that the facts or data 
upon which the expert rehe^ for his opinion in 
a particular field may be of the tvpe reason 
ably relied upon b> experts in the particular 
field in forming opinions and need not other-
wise be admissible also seams to expand Ruie 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court 
Foundation 
Impermissible bases 
—Hearsay 
—Specific cases 
Permissible bases 
—Facts or data relied on bv experts 
—Specific cases 
—Witnesses at trial 
Cited 
Discretion of court. 
The trial court is allowed considerable lati-
offer or refusal to take test, m attorney disci-
plinary proceeding, 79 A L R 4th 576 
Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of ex-
pert opinion allegedly stat ing whether drugs 
were possessed with intent to distribute — 
state cases, 83 A L R 4th 629 
Admissibility of expert opinion stating 
whether a particular knife was, or could have 
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A L R 4th 
660 
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal 
case to assistance of ps>chiatnst or psycholo-
gist 85 A L R 4th 19 
Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of ex-
pert opinion evidence as to "blood splatter" in-
terpretation 9 A L R 5th 369 
Propriety of questioning expert witness re-
garding specific incidents or allegations of ex-
pert s unprofessional conduct or professional 
negligence 11 A L R 5th 1 
Admissibility, m homicide prosecution, of ev-
idence as to tests made to ascertain distance 
from gun to victim when gun was fired, 11 
A L R 5th 497 
Reliability of scientific technique and its ac-
ceptance within scientific community as affect-
ing admissibility, at federal trial , of expert tes-
timony as to result of test or study based on 
such technique — modern cases, 105 A L R 
Fed 299 
Key Numbers. — Evidence «=> 470 et seq , 
505 et seq 
56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) But see 
Lamb v Bangart, 525 P 2d 602 (Utah 1974) 
Recent Utah cases have tended towards recog-
nition of the position taken bv this rule 
Edwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Utah 
1979) Kallas v Kallas, 614 P 2d 641 (Utah 
1980), State v Clayton, 639 P 2d 168 (Utah 
1982) 
Amendmen t Notes . — Tne 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
rule to make the language gender r eu t r a l 
tuoe of discretion in the admissibility of expert 
testimonv, and in the absence of a clear show-
ing of abuse its decision will not be reversed 
Lamb v Bangart, 525 P 2d 602 (Utah 1974) 
Foundation. 
Defendant's own testimony provided suffi-
cient foundation for officer's expert testimony 
rebutting defendant's intoxication defense See 
State v Tennyson, 850 P 2d 461 (Utah Ct App 
1993) 
Impermissible bases . 
—Hearsay . 
An expert's opinion may not be based on 
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts . 
The facts or data m the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at 
or before the hearing If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field m forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
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pute the new benefit amount, until after the provisions 
of Section 35-4-5(d) no longer apply. Any such redeter-
mination must be requested by the claimant and will be 
effective the beginning of the week in which the written 
request for a redetermination is made. 
R562-5d-ll. Availability. 
If benefits are not denied under Section 35-4-5(d), 
time spent walking picket lines, working for the bar-
gaining unit, etc. must be considered with regard to the 
claimant's availability for work. A refusal to seek work 
except with employers involved in a lockout or strike is 
a restriction on availability which also must be consid-
ered in accordance with the regulations for Section 35-
4-4(c). 
R562-5d-12. Suitability of Work Available Due to a 
Strike. 
Section 35-4-5(c)(2) provides that new work is not 
suitable and benefits shall not be denied if the position 
offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout or 
other labor dispute. If the claimant was laid off or fur-
lough ed prior to the strike, and an offer of employment 
is made after the strike begins by the former employer, 
it is considered an offer of new work. The vacancy must 
be presumed to be the result of the strike unless the 
claimant had a definite date of recall, or recall has his-
torically occurred at a similar time. 
R562-5d-13. Strike Benefits. 
Strike benefits received by a claimant which are paid 
contingent upon walking a picket line or for other ser-
vices are reportable income which must be deducted 
from any weekly benefits to which the claimant is eligi-
ble in accordance with provisions of Section 35-4-3(c). 
Money received for performance of services in behalf of 
a striking union may not be subject wages used as wage 
credits in establishing a claim. However, money 
received as a general donation from the union treasury 
which requires no personal services is not reportable 
income. 
KEY: unemployment compensation, strikes 
1987 35-4-5d 
R562-5e. F raud . 
R562-5e-l. General Definition. 
R562-5e-2. Elements of Fraud. 
R562-5e-3. Evidence and Burden of Proof. 
R562-5e-4. Disqualification and Penalty. 
R562-5e-5. Repayment. 
R562-5e-6. Future Eligibility. 
R562-5e-7. Examples. 
R562-5e-l. General Definition. 
The Department relies primarily on information pro-
vided by the claimant when paying unemployment 
insurance benefits. The Act provides severe penalties 
for fraud, but the provisions of this section do not apply 
if the overpayment was the result of an inadvertent 
error. There must be a willful misrepresentation or con-
cealment of information for the purpose of obtaining 
unemployment benefits to which the claimant was not 
entitled for fraud to exist. The absence of an admission 
or direct proof of intent to defraud does not prevent the 
conclusion that the claimant violated this section of the 
Act. 
R562-5e-2. Elements of Fraud. 
The elements necessary to establish an intentional 
misrepresentation sufficient to be considered fraud are: 
1. Materiality 
Materiality is established when the claimant makes 
false statements or fails to provide accurate informa-
tion for the purpose of obtaining waiting week credit or 
any benefit payment to which he is not entitled. Bene-
fits received by reason of fraud may include an amount 
as small as $1 over that which the claimant was enti-
tled to receive. 
2. Knowledge 
The claimant must have known, or should have 
known that the information he submitted to the 
Department was incorrect or that he failed to provide 
information required by the Department. He does NOT 
have to know that the information will result in a 
denial of benefits or a reduction of the benefit amount. 
Knowledge is established when a claimant recklessly 
makes representations knowing he has insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representations 
either because he failed to read material provided by 
the Department or to inquire when there was a ques-
tion about what he was required to report. 
3. Willfulness (Control) 
The claimant must have made the false statement or 
omission for the purpose of obtaining benefits. Purpose 
or willfulness to receive benefits is established when 
the claimant files claims or other documents containing 
false statements or omissions. If he delegates his 
responsibility to personally provide information to 
another person, it is done contrary to instructions from 
the Department, and he is responsible for the informa-
tion provided or omitted by the other person, even when 
he did not have advance knowledge that the informa-
tion thus provided or omitted was false. 
R562-5e-3. Evidence and Burden of Proof. 
1. Prior Knowledge of Ineligibility by the Department 
If the Department has evidence sufficient to assess a 
disqualification prior to the granting of benefits, a fraud 
disqualification will not be assessed even if the docu-
ments submitted by the claimant contained false state-
ments or omissions. However, overpayments may be 
established in accordance with the provisions of Sec-
tions 35-4-6(d) or Ce) as appropriate. 
2. Initial Burden of Proof 
Fraud cannot be presumed whenever false informa-
tion has been provided or material information omitted 
and benefits have been overpaid. The Department has 
the burden of proof which is the responsibility to estab-
lish in the record that all the elements of fraud are 
present before a disqualification can be assessed. 
3. Standard of Proof 
The existence of the elements of fraud must be estab-
lished by a preponderance of evidence of the nature 
relied upon by reasonable individuals in the conduct of 
their affairs. There does not have to be an admission or 
direct proof of intent. 
4. Procedure 
A disqualification will be assessed under this provi-
sion of the Act if the claimant provides a sworn written 
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admission of all the elements of fraud. A sworn written 
admission is one wherein the signer declares or certifies 
tha t he knowingly withheld material information to 
receive benefits to which he was not entitled. In the 
absence of a sworn written admission, the claimant 
must be given an opportunity for a recorded hearing 
after he has been given notice of the issue, allegations, 
and possible penalties. If the claimant waives his right 
to a hearing by so advising the Department or failing to 
a t tend the hearing after receiving a notice, the Depart-
ment will issue a decision based on the available infor-
mation if that information is reasonably considered to 
be reliable. However, if the claimant failed to receive 
notice of the hearing due to circumstances beyond his 
control, his right to a hearing is not considered to have 
been provided, and, unless he waives his right to an ini-
tial hearing, the decision mus t be vacated and a new 
hear ing scheduled. For example: If at the time the 
notice of hearing was mailed the claimant had moved 
and therefore, the notice of hearing was not sent to his 
current address, the failure to receive the notice is 
beyond his control because he was not filing for unem-
ployment insurance benefits a t the time the notice was 
mailed and he had no obligation to provide the Depart-
ment with a correct address. 
R562-5e-4. Disqualif ication and Penalty. 
1. Penalty Cannot Be Modified 
The Department has no authori ty to reduce or other-
wise adjust the period of disqualification or the mone-
tary penalties required by the Act. 
2. Penalty Period 
If the claimant has fraudulently filed for benefits, the 
penalty for future weeks is 13 weeks for the first week 
of fraud, and 6 weeks for each additional week of fraud, 
not to exceed a total penalty period of 49 weeks. The 
penalty period begins on the Sunday following the ini-
tial issuance by the Depar tment of the Notice of Denial 
of Benefits with regard to the issue of fraud. 
3. Week of Fraud 
A "week with respect to which" includes each week for 
which waiting week credit is given or any payment has 
been claimed as the result of fraud. 
4. Overpayment and Administrative Penalty 
When a claimant is found to have committed fraud, he 
is disqualified and an overpayment will be established 
for the amount of benefits actually received for the 
week(,s). In addition, the claimant is required to pay as 
a penalty the amount of benefits actually received as a 
direct result of the fraud for the week(s). 
a. ''Benefits actually received" means the benefits 
paid or constructively paid by the Department. Con-
structively paid means those benefits used to reduce or 
off-set an overpayment or used as a payment to the 
Office of Recovery Services for child support obligations 
or other payments permitted by law. 
5. Additional Penalties 
Criminal fines and imprisonment for acts of fraud 
may be pursued as provided by Section 35-4-19(a) of the 
Act, in addition to the administrative penalties. 
R562-5e-5. Repayment. 
Repayment of overpayments established under this 
section of the Act will be collected in accordance with 
provisions and Rules of Section 35-4-6(d) or by civil 
action or warran t as provided by Sections 35-4-17(c) 
and (e). The Department will use unemployment insur-
ance benefits due for weeks prior to the penalty period 
to reduce overpayments. 
R562-5e-6. F u t u r e El igibi l i ty . 
A claimant is ineligible for any unemployment bene-
fits or waiting week credit following the disqualification 
for fraud as long as any amount is owed. Therefore, the 
overpayment established under this section of the Act 
may NOT be satisfied by deductions from benefit checks 
for weeks claimed after the penalty period ends, 
because the claimant cannot receive any future benefits 
or credit for a waiting week as long as there is an out-
standing fraud overpayment. However, he may be 
allowed to file a subsequent initial claim to protect his 
rights to benefits with respect to a benefit year. An over-
payment is considered satisfied at the beginning of the 
week in which the cash payment is received by the 
Department or in the case of payment by personal 
check, the beginning of the week in which the check has 
been honored by the bank. If the claimant was not 
aware a t the time of filing an initial claim tha t he had 
an outstanding fraud overpayment, benefits will be 
allowed as of the effective date of the new claim if the 
claimant repays the overpayment within seven (7) days 
of when he is advised of the overpayment. 
R562-5e-7. Examples . 
1. Failure to Report Reason for Separation 
If the claimant failed to report the correct reason for 
separation which, if reported, would have resulted in 
an indefinite disqualification; the elements of fraud are 
established; and he consequently received 26 weeks of 
unemployment insurance benefits to which he was not 
entitled, fraud is committed with respect to all 26 
weeks because all the subsequent payments were made 
as a result of the fraudulent omission, even though 
false s ta tements were not made during each of those 
weeks. An overpayment must be assessed for each of 
the 26 weeks, and the penalty period is 13 weeks for the 
first week and 6 weeks for each additional week, up to 
49 weeks. The claimant must repay twice the amount 
received for all 26 weeks. 
2. Failure to Report Earnings 
If the claimant has a weekly benefit amount of $100 
and reports no earnings, when in fact he earned $50, he 
was overpaid $20 after consideration of the 30% earn-
ings allowance. However, if he is found to have commit-
ted fraud with respect to this week, he will be 
disqualified for the week under Section 35-4- 5(e) and 
all benefits received for a week of disqualification must 
be repaid. The overpayment is $100 for the week and an 
additional penalty of $100 which is the fraud penalty. 
He is required to repay $200. He will also be penalized 
for 13 weeks beginning with the Sunday following the 
issuance of the decision. 
KEY: fraud 
1988 35-4-5(e) 
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party, with a clear s ta tement of the right of appeal or 
judicial review. If a request for reopening is made, a 
hearing will be scheduled and notice will be given or 
mailed to each par ty to the appeal, to determine if there 
is good cause for reopening the hearing 
a. Failure to report as instructed at the time and place 
of the scheduled hear ing is the equivalent of failing to 
participate even if the party reports at another time or 
place. In such circumstances, the party must make a 
written request for rescheduling and show good cause 
in accordance with these Rules before the matter will be 
rescheduled. 
b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal 
hearing may not include such things as: 
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the 
notice of hearing, 
(2) Failure to a r range personal circumstances such as 
transportation or child care, 
(3) Failure to a r range for receipt or distribution of 
mail, 
(4) Failure to delegate responsibility for participation 
in the hearing, 
(5) Forgetfulness. 
c. In the event t h a t an appeal has been taken or an 
application for review has been made to the Board of 
Review before the request for reopening is filed, such 
request will be referred to the Board of Review. 
R562-6c-12. Withdrawal of Appeal . 
Any party who h a s filed an appeal from a decision of 
the Department may request withdrawal of the appeal 
by making a request to an Administrative Law Judge, 
explaining the reasons for the withdrawal. The Admin-
istrative Law Judge may deny such a request if the 
withdrawal of the appeal could result in a disservice to 
any of the part ies , including the Commission. 
R562-6c-13. C o m m i s s i o n a Party to P r o c e e d i n g s . 
The Departments is the authorized agent of the com-
mission. The Act requires tha t the commission be given 
notice of the pendency of an appeal and that the com-
mission will be a par ty to the proceedings. Unless the 
Department designates a representative who is autho-
rized to represent the Department in appeals, notifica-
tion of appeals will be sent to the local office which 
rendered the initial determination. As a par ty to the 
hearing the Depar tment or its representatives have all 
rights and responsibilities of other interested part ies to 
present evidence, br ing witnesses, cross-examine wit-
nesses, give rebut ta l evidence, and appeal decisions of 
the Administrative Law Judge. Where the burden of 
proof is with the Department , the failure of the Depart-
ment to meet t ha t burden may result in an unfavorable 
ruling for the Depar tment . The Administrative Law 
Judge cannot act as the agent for the Department and 
therefore is limited to including in the record only tha t 
evidence which is in the Department files or submitted 
by Department representatives. Witnesses for the 
Department may be called on the motion of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge when the need for such testimony 
is necessary to clarify ra ther than impeach the testi-
mony or evidence presented by the other parties, or the 
need for such witnesses or evidence could not have been 
anticipated by the Department prior to the hearing. 
R562-6c-14. P r o m p t Not i f i ca t ion of Dec i s ion . 
All decisions by Administrative Law Judges which 
affect the rights of any party with regard to benefits, 
tax liability, or jurisdictional issues will be issued 
(mailed to the last known address of the parties or 
delivered in person) in writing with a complete state-
ment of the findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions 
of law. Each appeal decision which is sent to the parties 
will include or be accompanied by a notice specifying 
the further appeal rights of the parties. The notice of 
appeal rights shall state clearly the place and manner 
for taking an appeal from the decision and the period 
within which an appeal may be taken. 
R562-6c-15. F i n a l i t y of D e c i s i o n . 
Decisions of the Administrative Law Judge are bind-
ing on all parties and are the final decision of the Com-
mission as provided by Section 35-4-10(0 unless 
appealed within ten days of mail ing or delivery of the 
decision. 
KEY: unemployment compensation, appellate procedures 
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R562-6d. Fault Overpayments . 
R562-6d-l. General Definition. 
R562-6d-2, Fraud. 
R562-6d-3. Claimant Fault. 
R562-6d-4. Method of Repayment of Faul t 
Overpayments. 
R562-6d-l. G e n e r a l Def in i t ion . 
This section of the Act identifies the repayment 
requirements of individuals who have been overpaid 
due to fraud, or due to claimant fault not constituting 
fraud. 
R562-6d-2. Fraud. 
1. When the Department has evidence of an overpay-
ment resulting from the claimant's failure to properly 
report material information, the claimant will be noti-
fied of the issue, given an opportunity for a hearing, and 
told that payments are being held pending a decision. 
In such circumstances, payment of benefits for claims 
currently m process may be held for up to two weeks 
pending a hearing with regard to the issue of fraud or 
the issuance of an overpayment decision. Benefit pay-
ments which have not been paid for eligible weeks prior 
to the disqualification period under Section 35-4-o^e), 
shall be used to reduce such an overpayment. 100% of 
the benefit check to which he is entitled will be used to 
reduce the overpayment. 
2. The overpayment and penalt ies for fraud are estab-
lished only when benefits have been denied under Sec-
tion 35-4-5(e). The amount of the repayment is 
determined by tha t Section of the Act and following 
such a decision, must be repaid in cash before the 
claimant will be eligible to establish a waiting week 
credit or receive future benefit payments. Therefore, 
the overpayment and penalties cannot be offset. 
R562-6d-3. Claimant Fault . 
1. Elements of Faul t 
Fault is established if all three of the following ele-
ments are present. If one or more element cannot be 
R562-6d-4 Industrial Commission 392 
established, the overpayment does not fall under the 
provisions of this section of the Act. 
a. Materiality 
Benefits were paid to which the claimant was not 
entitled. 
b. Control 
Benefits were paid based on incorrect information or 
an absence of information which the claimant reason-
ably could have provided. 
c. Knowledge 
The claimant had sufficient notice that the informa-
tion might be reportable. 
2. Claimant Responsibility 
The claimant is responsible for providing all of the 
information requested of him in written documents 
regarding his Unemployment Insurance claim, as well 
as any verbal instructions given by a Department rep-
resentative. Before certifying that he is eligible for ben-
efits, he is under obligation to make proper inquiry if he 
has any questions to determine definitely what is 
required. Therefore, when a claimant has knowledge 
that certain information may affect his claim, but 
makes his own determination that the information is 
not material or if he ignores it, he is a t fault. 
3. Receipt of Sett lement or Back-Pay 
a. A claimant is "at fault" for an overpayment created 
if he fails to advise the Department tha t grievance pro-
cedures are being pursued which may result in pay-
ment of wages for weeks he claims benefits. 
b. When the claimant advises the Department prior to 
receiving a set t lement tha t he has filed a grievance 
with his employer, and he makes an assignment direct-
ing the employer to pay to the Department tha t portion 
of the set t lement equivalent to the amount of unem-
ployment compensation he receives, he will not be "at 
fault" if an overpayment is created due to payment of 
wages a t t r ibutable to weeks for which he receives ben-
efits. If the grievance is resolved in favor of the claim-
ant and the employer was properly notified of the wage 
assignment, the employer is liable to immediately reim-
burse the Unemployment Insurance Fund upon settle-
ment of the grievance. If reimbursement is not made to 
the Department consistent with the provisions of the 
Assignment, collection procedures will be initiated 
against the employer. 
c. If the claimant refuses to make an assignment of 
the wages he is claiming in a grievance proceeding, ben-
efits will be withheld on the basis that he is not unem-
ployed because he anticipates receipt of wages. In this 
case, the claimant should file weekly claims and if he 
does not receive back wages when the grievance is 
resolved, benefits will be paid for weeks properly 
claimed provided he is otherwise eligible. 
R 5 6 2 - 6 d - 4 . M e t h o d o f R e p a y m e n t of F a u l t 
Overpayments . 
1. When the claimant has been determined to be "at 
fault" in the creation of an overpayment, the overpay-
ment must be repaid. If payment is made by personal 
check, no benefit checks will be released until the per-
sonal check has been honored by the bank. If the claim-
ant is otherwise eligible and files for additional benefits 
during the same or any subsequent benefit year, 50% of 
the benefit check to which he is entitled will be used to 
reduce the overpayment. 
2. Discretion for Repayment 
a. Full restitution is required of all overpayments 
established under this Section of the Act At the discre-
tion of the Department, however, the claimant may not 
be required to make payments and legal collection pro-
ceedings may be held in abeyance. The overpayment 
will be deducted from future benefits payable during 
the current or subsequent benefit years. Discretion may 
be exercised: 
(1) if the Department or the employer share fault in 
the creation of the overpayment, or 
(2) if installment payments would impose unreason-
able hardship such as in the case of an individual with 
an income which does not provide for additional money 
beyond minimum living requirements. 
b. The Department cannot exercise repayment discre-
tion for fraud overpayments and these amounts are 
subject to all collection procedures. 
3. Installment Payments 
a. If repayment in full h a s not been made within 90 
days of the first billing the Department shall enter into 
an agreement with the claimant whereby repayment of 
the money owed is collectible by monthly installments. 
The Department shall notify the claimant in writing of 
the minimum instal lment payment which the claimant 
is required to make. If the claimant is unable to make 
the minimum instal lment payments, he may request a 
review within ten days of the date writ ten notice is 
mailed or delivered. 
b. Installment agreements shall be established as fol-
lows: 
Overpayments Equal ing Minimum Monthly Payment 
$3,000 or less 50% of claimant's weekly benefit enti-
tlement 
3,001 to 5,000 100% of claimant's weekly benefit enti-
tlement 
5,001 to 10,000 125%. of claimant's weekly benefit 
entitlement 
10,001 or more 150% of claimant's weekly benefit 
entitlement 
c. Installment agreements will not be approved in 
amounts less than those established above except in 
cases of extreme hardship . An ability to make a mini-
mal payment is presumed if the claimant has a house-
hold income which is in excess of the poverty level 
guidelines as established by the federal government 
and used co grant waivers of overpayments under Sec-
tion 35-4-6(e). The instal lment agreement will be 
reviewed periodically and adjustments made based 
upon changes in the claimant 's income or circumstance. 
A due date will be established for each installment 
agreement which is mutua l ly agreed upon by the claim-
ant and the Department . 
4. Collection Procedures 
a. Billings are sent to claimants with overpayments 
on a monthly basis. After 30 days, if payment is not 
made, the account is considered delinquent. If no pay-
ment has been received in 90 days the individual is 
notified tha t a war ran t will be filed unless a payment is 
received within 10 days. However, there may be other 
circumstances under which a warrant may be filed on 
any outstanding overpayment. A warrant attaches a 
lien to any personal or real property and establishes a 
judgment that is collectible under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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b. All outstanding overpayments are reported to the 
State Auditor for collection whereby any refunds due to 
the individual from State income tax or any such 
rebates, refunds, or other amounts owed by the s tate 
and subject to legal a t tachment may be applied against 
the overpayment. 
5. Offset In Time 
Offset in time occurs when the claimant files valid 
weekly claims to replace weeks of benefits which were 
overpaid. When an overpayment is established after 
the claimant has exhausted all benefits, the claimant 
may file claims for additional weeks during the same 
benefit year provided he is otherwise eligible. Offset in 
time will be allowed on claims that have expired if a 
written request is made within 30 days of the notifica-
tion of the overpayment. No offset in time will be 
allowed on overpayments established under Section 35-
4- 5(e) of the Employment Security Act. One hundred 
percent (100%) of the weekly benefit amount for the 
weeks claimed will be credited against the established 
overpayment up to the amount of the balance owed to 
the Department. No penalty for late filing will be 
assessed when a claimant is otherwise eligible to file 
claims to offset in t ime. 
6. Overpayments Not Set Up (NSU) 
The minimum overpayment amount which will be 
established is determined by multiplying the s ta te 
maximum weekly benefit amount by 15% and rounding 
the result to the next highest $5. Overpayments of less 
than this amount will not be set up (NSU), except if the 
overpayment is the resul t of fraud, as the amount does 
not justify the expense of collection. Accumulations of 
overpaid benefits, accruing from more than one week, 
which equal more t h a n the minimum overpayment 
amount may be established. 
KEY: unemployment compensation, overpayments 
1990 35-4-6d 
R562-6e. Non-Fault Overpayments. 
R562-6e-l. General Definition. 
R562-6e-2. Responsibility. 
R562-6e-3. Method of Repayment. 
R562-6e-4. Waiver of Recovery of Overpayment. 
R562-6e-5. Overpayments Not Set Up (NSU). 
R562-6e-l . G e n e r a l Def in i t ion . 
This section of the Act identifies the repayment 
requirements of individuals who have received an over-
payment of benefits through no fault of their own. Such 
overpayments are referred to as "accounts not receiv-
able" (ANR). 
R562-6e-2. Responsibi l i ty . 
1. The claimant is responsible for providing all of the 
information requested in wri t ten documents as well as 
any verbal request from a Department representative. 
If the claimant has provided such information, and 
then receives benefits to which he is not entitled 
through an error of the Depar tment or an employer, he 
is not at fault for the overpayment. 
2. "Through no fault of his own "does not mean the 
claimant can shift responsibility for providing correct 
information to another person such as a spouse, parent , 
or friend. The claimant is responsible for all informa-
tion required on his claim. 
R562-6e-3. M e t h o d of R e p a y m e n t . 
Even though the claimant is without fault in the cre-
ation of the overpayment, 50 percent of the claimant's 
weekly benefit amount will be deducted (offset) from 
any future benefits payable to him until the overpay-
ment is repaid. No billings will be made and no collec-
tion procedures will be initiated. 
R562-6e-4. Waiver of R e c o v e r y of O v e r p a y m e n t . 
If waiver of recovery of overpayment is granted, the 
amount of the overpayment owing at the time the 
request is granted is withdrawn, forgiven or forgotten 
and the claimant has no further repayment obligation. 
Granting of a waiver will not be retroactive for any of 
the overpayment which has already been offset except 
if the offset was made pending a decision on a timely 
waiver request. 
1. Time Limitation for Requesting Waiver 
A waiver must be requested within 10 days of the 
notification of opportunity to request a waiver or within 
10 days of the first offset of benefits following a reopen-
ing or upon a showing of a significant change of the 
claimant's financial circumstances. Good cause will be 
considered if the claimant can show the failure to 
request a waiver within these time limitations was due 
to circumstances which were reasonable or beyond his 
control. 
2. Basic Needs of Survival 
The claimant may be granted a waiver of the overpay-
ment if recovery by 50 percent offset would create an 
inability to pay for the basic needs of survival for the 
immediate family, dependents and other household 
members. In making this waiver determination, the 
Department shall take into consideration all the poten-
tial resources of the claimant, the claimant's family, 
dependents and other household members. The claim-
ant will be required to provide documentation of 
claimed resources. The claimant must also provide 
social security numbers of family members, dependents 
and household members. "Economically disadvan-
taged "for federal programs is defined as 70 percent of 
the Lower Living Standard Income Level (LLSIL). 
'Inability to meet the basic needs of survival "is defined 
consistent with "economically disadvantaged. "There-
fore, if the claimant's total family resources in relation 
to family size are not in excess of 70 percent of the 
LLSEL, the waiver will be granted provided the eco-
nomic circumstances are not expected to change withm 
an indefinite period of time. Individual expenses will 
not be considered. 
3. Indefinite Period 
An indefinite period of time is defined as the current 
month and at least the next two months. Therefore, the 
duration of the financial hardship must be expected to 
last at least three months. If t he claimant or household 
members expect to re turn to work within the three 
months the anticipated income will be included in 
determining if he lacks basic needs of survival for an 
indefinite period of time. Available resources will be 
averaged for the three months. 
R562-6e-o. Overpayments N o t Set Up (NSU). 
The minimum overpayment amount which will be 
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efits overpaid as a result of a Department decision 
which is later reversed. Any benefits established as an 
overpayment due to claimant fault will be deducted 
from the employer's liability or refunded as the over-
payment is repaid by the claimant. 
R562-75-6. R e c o r d s of Benef i t s Pa id . 
The Department will maintain records of benefits 
paid to former employees of reimbursable employers for 
five calendar years. Such records will include the name 
and social security account number of each employee, 
the week for which payment is made, and the amount 
of each payment. 
R562-75-7. Month ly B i l l ing of Benefi ts P a i d . 
The Department will send a monthly billing to the 
reimbursable employer if any benefits have been paid 
to former employees. The billing will include the name 
and social security account number of each claimant, 
the amount of the payment to each claimant on the 
basis of wages paid to him by the reimbursable 
employer in his base period, and the total amount paid 
to all such claimants dur ing the previous calendar 
month. 
KEY: unemployment compensation, nonprofit organization 
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R562-85. Governmental Units. 
R562-85-1. General Definition. 
R562-85-2. Governmental Units. 
R562-85-3. Effective Period of Payments by 
Contributions or Reimbursement . 
R562-85-4. Liability of a Governmental Unit When 
Changing the Method of Payment . 
R562-85-5. Reimbursable Employer's Liability for 
Benefits Paid. 
R562-85-6. Records of Benefits Paid. 
R562-85-7. Monthly Billing of Benefits Paid. 
R562-85-1. General Def ini t ion. 
1. Only part of Section 35-4-8.5 of the Act is quoted 
above; the balance of this Section of the Act describes 
how governmental un i t s elect the method of paying for 
benefits, the effective period of such election, billing 
and collection procedures for the reimbursement 
method and appeal r ights related to the election. 
2. Governmental un i t s described in paragraph B of 
this Rule will pay contributions in the same manner as 
other employers (see Section 35-4-7) unless they elect to 
become reimbursable employers which are liable for 
payments in lieu of contributions. A governmental uni t 
which elects to become a reimbursable employer pays to 
the Department an amount equal to the regular bene-
fits and all of the extended benefits paid to former 
employees. These re imbursements for benefits paid are 
due and payable monthly. Reimbursable employers do 
not pay any adminis trat ive expenses of the unemploy-
ment insurance program. 
R562-85-2. G o v e r n m e n t a l Units . 
The governmental un i t s to which this section of the 
Act applies are any county, city, town, school district, or 
political subdivision and instrumentality of the forego-
ing or any combination thereof. This section also 
applies to political subdivisions or instrumentalities of 
the State of Utah or other s ta tes as provided by Section 
35-4-22(j)(2)(D)(iii). A political subdivision or instru-
mentality of a state, county, city, town or school district 
is a subdivision thereof to which has been delegated 
certain functions of that state, county, etc. Examples of 
governmental units to which this section applies are 
county water conservancy districts, state universities, 
city fire departments, associations of county govern-
ments, etc. Indian tribes are not among the governmen-
tal entities included in this section and do not qualify to 
elect reimbursable status. The provisions of this rule to 
not apply to federal agencies. 
R 5 6 2 - 8 5 - 3 . E f f e c t i v e P e r i o d of P a y m e n t s b y 
C o n t r i b u t i o n s or R e i m b u r s e m e n t . 
1. Initial Election 
A governmental unit electing to become a reimburs-
able employer must make a writ ten election within 30 
days after the organization become subject to the Act. 
The Department may for good cause extend the 30 day 
period within which the election is made. This initial 
election remains in effect for a t least one full contribu-
tion year (calendar year). 
2. Subsequent Elections 
A governmental unit may elect to change from the 
contributions to the reimbursement method or from the 
reimbursement method to the contributions method. Tb 
be consistent with the principle of Subsection 35-4-
8.5(a)(4), changes from one method to the other will 
remain in effect for at least two contribution years (cal-
endar years). Any election to change from one method 
of payment to the other mus t be made in writing no 
later than 30 days prior to J a n u a r y 1 of the year for 
which the change is requested. The Department may 
for good cause extend the 30 day period within which a 
change from one method to the other is requested. As 
provided by Subsection 35-4-8.5(c), the Department 
may terminate the reimbursement s ta tus if the govern-
mental unit is delinquent in making the reimburse-
ment payments. 
R562-85-4. Liabi l i ty of a Governmenta l Unit When 
Chang ing the Method of P a y m e n t . 
A governmental unit changing from the reimburse-
ment to the contributions method must reimburse the 
Department for benefits paid on wages earned during 
the time the organization was a reimbursable 
employer. Example: A governmental unit was a reim-
bursable employer during 1985 and 1986. For 1987 the 
organization elects to pay contributions. If a former 
employee receives benefits in 1987 based on wages paid 
by the organization in 1986, the organization must 
reimburse the Department for the benefits based on the 
1986 wages. The organization mus t also pay contribu-
tions on the 1987 wages. If th is organization changes 
back to the reimbursement method in 1989, any bene-
fits received by a former employee which were based on 
wages paid in 1988 would not be subject to reimburse-
ment since contributions have been paid on those 
wages. 
R562-85-5. Reimbursable Employer 's Liabil ity for 
Benefits Paid . 
The reimbursable employer's liability will be limited 
to the benefits paid to the claimant and benefits over-
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paid as a result of the failure of the reimbursable 
employer to provide complete and accurate information 
within the time limitations of the Department 's 
request. The employer will be liable even if good cause 
for the failure to properly provide the information can 
be established. The employer will not be liable for ben-
efits overpaid as a resul t of a Department decision 
which is later reversed. Any benefits established as an 
overpayment due to claimant fault will be deducted 
from the employer's liability or refunded as the over-
payment is repaid by the claimant. Federal regulation 
20 CFR Sections 609.11 and 614.11 state that federal 
agencies receive adjustments (credits) when overpay-
ments are recovered. 
R562-85-6. R e c o r d s of Benef i t s P a i d . 
The Department will mainta in records of benefits 
paid to former employees of reimbursable employers for 
five calendar years. Such records will include the name 
and social security account number of each employee, 
the week for which payment is made, and the amount 
of each payment. 
R562-85-7. Monthly B i l l ing of Benefits Paid . 
The Department will send a monthly billing to the 
reimbursable employer if any benefits have been paid 
to former employees. The billing will include the name 
and social security account number of each claimant, 
the amount of the payment to each claimant on the 
basis of wages paid to him by the reimbursable 
employer in his base period and the total amount paid 
to all such claimants dur ing the previous calendar 
month. 
KEY: unemployment compensation, government corporations 
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R568. Industrial Accidents, 
R568-1. Workers* Compensation Rules - Procedures. 
R568-2. Workers* Compensation Rules - Health Care 
Providers. 
R568-3. Workers* Compensation Rules - Self-Insurance. 
R568-4. Premium Rates. 
R568-1. Workers' Compensation Rules -
Procedures. 
R568-1-1. Definitions. 
R5 68-1-2. Authority. 
R568-1-3. Official Forms. 
R568-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
R568-1-5. Allowance for Mailing. 
R568-1-6. Business Hours. 
R568-1-7. Attorney Fees. 
R568-1-8. Witness Fees. 
R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
R568-1-10. Compensation for Medical Testimony. 
R568-1-11. Discount. 
R568-1-12. Interest. 
R568-1-13. Issuance of Checks. 
R568-1-14. Acceptance/Denial of a Claim. 
R568-1-15. Compensation Agreements. 
R568-1-16. Settlement Agreements. 
R568-M7. Permanent Tbtal Disability. 
R568-1-1. Definitions. 
A. "Commission "- means the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. 
B. "Applicant/Plaintiff"- means an injured employee 
or his/her dependent(s) or any person seeking relief or 
claiming benefits under the Workers' Compensation 
and/or Occupational Disease and Disability Laws. 
C. "Defendant "- means an employer, insurance car-
rier, self-insurer, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 
and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
D. "Administrative Law Judge "- means a person duly 
designated by the Industrial Commission to hear and 
determine disputed or other cases under the provisions 
of Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and of Title 63, Chapter 
46b, U.C.A. 
E. "Insurance Carrier "- includes all insurance compa-
nies writing workers' compensation and occupational 
disease and disability insurance, the Workers' Compen-
sation Fund, and self-insurers who are granted self-
insuring privileges by the Industr ial Commission. In all 
cases involving no insurance coverage by the employer, 
the term "Insurance Carrier "includes the employer. 
F. "Medical Panel "- means a panel appointed by the 
Commission pursuant to the s tandards set forth in Sec-
tions 35-1-77 and 35-2-56, U.C.A., which is responsible 
to make findings regarding disputed medical aspects of 
a compensation claim, and may make any additional 
findings, perform any tests, or make any inquiry as the 
Commission may require. 
G. "Award "- means the finding or decision of the Com-
mission or Administrative Law Judge as to the amount 
of compensation or benefits due any injured employee 
or the dependent(s) of a deceased employee. 
R568-1-2. Authority. 
This rule is being enacted under the authority of Sec-
tions 35-1-10, 35-2-5, and 35-10-11, U.C.A. 
R568-1-3. Official Forms. 
A. "Employer's First Report of Injury - Form 122 "-
This form is used for reporting accidents, injuries, or 
occupational diseases as per Section 35-1-97, U.C.A. 
This form must be filed within seven days of the occur-
rence of the alleged industrial accident or the employ-
er's first knowledge or notification of the same. This 
form also serves as OSHAForm 101. 
B. "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occu-
pational Disease - Form 123 "- This form is used by all 
medical practitioners to report their initial t reatment of 
an injured employee. 
C. "Chiropractor's Supplemental Report - Form 124 "-
This form is to be filed with the insurance carrier or 
self-insurer after each 15 t rea tments administered by 
the chiropractic physician 
D. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer 
with Respect to Payment of Benefits - Form 141 "- This 
form is used for reporting the initial benefits paid to an 
injured employee. This form mus t be filed with or 
mailed to the Industrial Commission on the same date 
the first payment of compensation is mailed to the 
employee. A copy of this form mus t accompany the first 
payment 
E. "Statement of Insurance Carr ier or Self-Insurer 
with Respect to Discontinuance of Benefits - Form 142 
"- This form is to be used by insurance carriers or self-
insured employers to notify an employee of the discon-
tinuance of weekly compensation benefits. The form 
must be mailed to the employee and filed with the Com-
Delivery Certificate 
I certify that I mailed a two copies of the foregoing 
Appellants' Brief on this / / d a y of March, 1995 to the offices 
Of: 
Gregory DeBloois 
683 West 2200 North 
Clinton, Utah 84015 
Lorin Blauer, Esq. 
Department of Emp. Security 
140 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert 
18 
